While the various Senators and Congressmen continue to wrap the knuckles of President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld and the various generals at CENT-COM about our seemingly stalled efforts in the Iraq campaign, cooler heads like Max Boot have taken a good look at the events in Iraq and has offered a more positive assessment. Boot notes in his weekly column at the Los Angeles Times that these folks stepping before the TV cameras yelling at the top of their lungs "all is lost, the end is near" when it comes to Iraq, should step back and really look at the people causing the havoc in Saddam's former tyranny. Though the MSM and the various lawmakers seem to paint the insurgency into a nation-wide force like they were in the Philippines in 1898, Malaysia in 1950's, Vietnam from 1945-1975, Boot notes that the reality is a challange but much more manageable. If you paid attention to the talking heads instead of strategic thinkers like Boot few would know:
Support for the insurgency is confined to a minority within a minority— a small portion of Sunni Arabs, who make up less than 20% of the population. The only prominent non-Sunni rebel, Muqtada Sadr, has quietly joined the political process. The 80% of the population that is Shiite and Kurdish is implacably opposed to the rebellion, which is why most of the terror has been confined to four of 18 provinces.So if you happen to catch any of the various elected leaders on the TV or radio throwing out a calvelcade of complaints just remember that things are much more better in Iraq than these people present.
Unlike in successful guerrilla wars, the rebels in Iraq have not been able to control large chunks of "liberated" territory. The best they could do was to hold Fallouja for six months last year. Nor have they been able to stage successful large-scale attacks like the Viet Cong did. A major offensive against Abu Ghraib prison on April 2 ended without a single U.S. soldier killed or a single Iraqi prisoner freed, while an estimated 60 insurgents were slain.
The biggest weakness of the insurgency is that it is morphing from a war of national liberation into a revolutionary struggle against an elected government. That's a crucial difference. Since 1776, wars of national liberation have usually succeeded because nationalism is such a strong force. Revolutions against despots, from Czar Nicholas II to the shah of Iran, often succeed too, because there is no way to redress grievances within the political process. Successful uprisings against elected governments are much rarer because leaders with political legitimacy can more easily rally the population and accommodate aggrieved elements.
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