Throughout the vast John Bolton saga, we've seen various Senators citing this or that individual in the State Department or the CIA that Mr. Bolton had a run-in with or disagreed with on matters that dealt with WMD programs in places like North Korea and Cuba. Well according to this piece by Thomas Joscelyn in The Weekly Standard there's an understandable reason why Bolton had a problem over Cuba with the likes of CIA analyst Fulton Armstrong. As with a lot of individuals seated in the professional bureaucracy of the CIA and the State Department, Armstrong seems to doubt the threat from Cuba. See for yourself:
One of Armstrong's writings appears in an unclassified edition of the CIA's Studies in Intelligence from 2002. In a piece titled "Sorting Out 'National Interests', Ways to Make Analysis Relevant But Not Prescriptive," Armstrong sorts what politicians and policymakers debate as national interests into "four different types of priorities, only one or two of which are of genuine strategic importance."It's amazing that a CIA analyst could have such a myopic view of such a dangerous state like Cuba. Aside from being a human-rights hell-hole, Cuba has also played an active role in promoting its Marxist revolution throughout South America by supplying money and arms to various terrorists and individuals like Hugo Chavez. Yes, it's true that Cuba is not as pressing as a problem as the Islamic terrorists in the Middle East but it still shouldn't be pushed aside like Armstrong has done.
Armstrong classifies U.S. policies towards Cuba in the third of these categories and, thus, not of "genuine strategic importance." Under his category titled "sectoral interests," Armstrong explains,
. . . Sometimes issues that do not affect the whole country become elevated to national interest status because of the power of their constituencies. While generally consistent with the national interest, these policy priorities favor one parochial position over others. Their proactive constituencies espouse approaches that their opponents claim overshadow more important issues. Should analysts accept the point of view of narrow interest groups as valid expressions of national interest, when an administration appears to endorse them?
Armstrong then goes on to explain that U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba caters to "narrow interest groups":
On Cuba, senior and mid-level policymakers have barely concealed in the past the fact that a relatively small constituency is the most intense promoter of the "pressure cooker" approach of maintaining the economic embargo, isolating Havana internationally, and promoting internal upheaval. One past Coordinator for Cuban Affairs at the State Department would answer challenges to the government's policy, in open forum, with the answer, "Cuba is first and foremost a domestic political matter." You do not have to be a cynic to see a link between Cuba policy, Florida elections, and campaign finances. Most observers judge that the chance is extremely slim that explosive change on the island--the sectoral interest--would result in stability and democracy--the national interest. But that view continues to underpin the interpretation of our national interests in Cuba.
While Bolton has continued his great work as Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and sought a clarification of the intelligence reports on countries like Cuba for his speeches or other aspects of the World. Throughout this time, he would hit a brick-wall put up by Armstrong and liked minded individuals who had policies counter to the official US policy. Even with all of the problems, John Bolton has demonstrated his ability to get things done no matter what's thrown at him. If you can survive the entrenched bureaucracy of the State Department and the CIA, you shouldn't have a problem with the UN. No wonder why President Bush wants Bolton to be his man in the UN.
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